International law is real
The Hague's arrest warrant against Israeli leaders seemed to have had effects on the ground in Lebanon.
Israel and Lebanon agreed to a U.S.-French ceasefire proposal yesterday. What happens next remains to be seen, but it seems fair to say that the war ended in a frustrating military stalemate for both the Israeli army and the Lebanese militia Hezbollah, which is why both had to pull back. A separate peace between Israel and Lebanon is also bad news for Palestinians in Gaza, who have even fewer international protections than before.
Something curious happened, though. The morning after the ceasefire, France walked back its position on the International Criminal Court war crimes warrants for Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu and former defense minister Yoav Gallant. After stating that it “will always apply international law” several days ago, the French foreign ministry suddenly announced that “immunities apply to Prime Minister Netanyahu and other ministers in question.”
The straightforward interpretation is that international law is fake, because powerful countries will shield their allies (and particularly their golden calf Israel) from any kind of institutional accountability. But on closer examination, France appears to have traded away enforcing The Hague’s warrants in exchange for important concessions from Israel. Rather than being a useless piece of paper, the international court order was something with real material value — which is why it could be exchanged.
Although France is unfriendly to Hezbollah, its interests in Lebanon are directly opposed to the Israeli and U.S. plans for the country. All Israeli political factions wanted to abolish Lebanese sovereignty, from the nationalist settlers calling for full annexation to the opposition leader Benny Gantz, who wanted Israel to have the same security control over southern Lebanon that it does over the Palestinian territories. At a minimum, Israel demanded the right to keep firing even under a “ceasefire.”
France, on the other hand, feels protective over Lebanon as a crown jewel of its former empire. French foreign minister Jean-Noel Barrot publicly stated that the Israeli demands were “not compatible with the sovereignty of a strong country.” The French government told Lebanon in private not to accept a ceasefire under these conditions, to the personal annoyance of U.S. secretary of state Tony Blinken. Israel in turn demanded that France be cut out of any international peacekeeping force.
In the end, Israel and the United States relented. Rather than being able to unilaterally attack Lebanon for alleged violations of the ceasefire, Israel will have to lodge complaints with a U.S.-French monitoring committee, which will set a deadline for the Lebanese state and United Nations peacekeepers to respond. Again, although it remains to be seen how this deal plays out, the agreement as written gives international backing to the principle of Lebanese sovereignty over Lebanese territory.
According to Israeli state media, Israel and the United States demanded that France “declare that Netanyahu will not be arrested” as a condition of being part of the peacekeeping process. Of course, that probably wasn’t the only factor in accepting French demands; there were limits to what Israel and the United States could impose on Lebanon without putting American boots on the ground. But at the very least, Washington and Tel Aviv saw an international legal decision as a bargaining chip that could be exchanged for concessions in the military situation.
And that had a real effect on Lebanese people. The Israeli military ordered civilians not to come back until the withdrawal was complete, but it could only do so much to stop them under the ceasefire terms, leaving Israeli journalists to stew in their rage that Lebanese civilians dared approach areas cleansed by Israeli troops. In an indirect way, The Hague’s order mattered.
So why did The Hague’s order matter? Why was it something that France could hold over Israel’s head? That question could take up an entire series of books. Lawyers, political scientists, historians, anthropologists, and other disciplines will all have different answers. And the negotiations that led to yesterday’s agreement will provide plenty of material to work with.